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An African Theory of Good Leadership
Thaddeus Metz
Introducing African Values
International academic reflection on good leadership has tended to follow 
the rise of political or economic power, first in the West and then in the East. 
As has been pointed out, ideas indigenous to Africa are under-represented 
in the English-speaking literature on leadership (Blunt & Jones, 1997; 
Ncube, 2010:77–78). The authors of a book devoted to personal growth 
suggest, “Of all the gifts that Africa has given the world, African values 
in leadership have not yet claimed the place that they could” (Nussbaum, 
Palsule, & Mkhize, 2010:5).
There are a number of reasons for thinking that this ignorance of African1 
understandings of good leadership is unwelcome. One familiar rationale is 
that interaction in a globalized world requires familiarity with the views 
of “the other” as a matter of prudence. Another important rationale is 
that any long-standing culture probably has some insight into the human 
condition, such that one risks being mistaken about what counts as a good 
leader if one remains unfamiliar with African culture. Despite having been 
a largely oral tradition until recently, African philosophy and related ideas 
have been in existence for at least several hundred years and, as this article is 
meant to show, their implications for leadership merit global consideration.
This article draws on the indigenous African intellectual tradition to 
ground a moral-philosophical theory of leadership that is meant to con-
stitute a plausible rival to salient accounts of leadership in the East Asian 
and Western traditions. Specifically, it articulates an interpretation of the 
characteristically African value of communion and indicates how this Afro-
communal value system grounds a certain ideal approach to leadership. 
Along the way, the article contrasts the implications of Afro-communal 
leadership, particularly with those of Confucianism and Kantian contract 
theory, and suggests that, by comparison, the African theory deserves to 
be treated as a viable alternative to them.
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This article does not appeal to all prescriptive ideas about African leader-
ship in the contemporary literature or from traditional practices. Instead 
of trying to accommodate every idea from the African context, this article 
advances a reading of one purportedly basic value from it that should be 
taken seriously by a twenty-first century, open-minded ethicist or related 
enquirer from any part of the world and then considers what it entails for 
good leadership. Such a moral orientation, as is spelled out in the next 
section (sec. 2), is relational. After spelling out this specifically communal 
ethic, the article draws out of it a conception of good leadership (sec. 3), and 
then applies this conception to a variety of topics, including how decisions 
ought to be made within a firm or other large organization, who counts 
as a stakeholder, and how to deal with non-performing or misbehaving 
employees (sec. 4). For each topic, the article notes respects in which Afro-
communal leadership supports approaches that differ from those prescribed 
by other, more internationally familiar views of it, and it suggests that its 
implications are prima facie attractive relative to them.
Communion as a Basic African Value
In recent years there have been a number of literate, philosophical inter-
pretations of the African ethical tradition (e.g., Bujo, 1997; Gyekye, 1997), 
but this article draws on one according to which communal relationship is 
to be pursued as an end, and not merely means to some other value such as 
society’s well-being or people’s life force (an imperceptible vital energy that 
has come from God). This interpretation is advanced as merely one plau-
sible moral philosophy grounded on sub-Saharan customs, and specifically 
as an attractive way to understand two maxims widely taken to capture 
indigenous sub-Saharan ethical thought, namely, “I am because we are” 
and “A person is a person through other persons.”2
These phrases are routinely used to express an ethical judgment, specifi-
cally the prescription to become a real self or a complete person (Wiredu, 
1992; Menkiti, 2004), or, in the influential southern African vernacular, 
they are exhortations to exhibit ubuntu, the Nguni term for humanness 
or human excellence (Mokgoro, 1998; Tutu, 1999:32–35; Khoza, 2006). 
According to this ethic, the ultimate answer to the question of why one 
should live one way rather than another is the fact that it would make 
one a better person. There is a distinctively human and higher part of our 
nature and a lower, animal self, and both can be realized to various degrees. 
That is, the thought is that one can be more or less of a human, person, 
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or self, and one’s basic aim in life should be to develop one’s humanness, 
personhood, or selfhood as much as one can. Indeed, it is common for 
those from indigenous African cultures to describe those who are wicked as 
“not persons,” “zero-persons,” or even “animals” (Wiredu, 1992:199–200; 
Gyekye, 1997:49–51; Nkulu-N’Sengha, 2009:144).3
Turning to the second part of the maxims, one becomes a real self 
“because we are” or a complete person “through other persons,” which 
roughly means insofar as one prizes communal or harmonious relation-
ships with others. As Augustine Shutte, who has provided a book-length 
interpretation of an ubuntu ethic, remarks, “Our deepest moral obligation 
is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more 
deeply into community with others. So although the goal is personal fulfil-
ment, selfishness is excluded” (2001:30). It is common for ethicists working 
in the African tradition to maintain, or at least to suggest, that the only 
comprehensive respect in which one can exhibit human excellence is by 
relating to others communally or harmoniously.
To begin to appreciate how one large swathe of African moral thought 
has been fundamentally relational, consider these remarks about sub-Saharan 
values and norms from theorists who are from various parts of the continent:
“(I)n African societies, immorality is the word or deed which 
undermines fellowship,” says the Ugandan theologian Peter 
Kasenene (1998:21).
“Social harmony is for us (Africans—ed.) the summum bonum—
the greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines this 
sought-after good is to be avoided like the plague,” according to 
the South African former Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Desmond Tutu (1999:35).
“(O)ne should always live and behave in a way that maximises 
harmonious existence at present as well as in the future,” pre-
scribes the Zimbabwean academic ethicist Munyaradzi Murove 
(2007:181).
“A life of cohesion, or positive integration with others, becomes 
a goal, one that people design modalities for achieving. Let us 
call this goal communalism, or, as other people have called it, 
communitarianism. In light of this goal, the virtues . . . also become 
3
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desirable,” opines the Kenyan intellectual historian of African 
philosophy Dismas Masolo (2010:240).
Talk of “fellowship,” “harmony,” and “cohesion” is recurrent in the 
above quotations, which suggest that these are to be valued for their own 
sake. That approach differs from the idea that these ways of relating are 
valuable merely as a means to some other value, such as the common good 
or vital force. It also is prima facie distinct from the most salient philosophi-
cal approaches to morally right action in the contemporary West, which 
typically appeal at bottom to utility promotion, respect for autonomy, or 
agreement in a social contract.
The next question is how one is to understand these relational goods, 
or what this article most often refers to as “communion.” Representative 
African theorists are again quoted about what it means to live in com-
munion, harmony, etc. with others, after which the article draws on their 
comments to advance a principle to guide thought about leadership matters:
“Every member is expected to consider him/herself an inte-
gral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards 
achieving the good of all,” says the Nigerian philosopher Segun 
Gbadegesin (1991:65) of his Yoruba people as an example.
“The fundamental meaning of community is the sharing of an 
overall way of life, inspired by the notion of the common good,” 
suggests the influential Ghanaian moral-political philosopher 
Kwame Gyekye (2004:16).
“(T)he purpose of our life is community-service and commu-
nity-belongingness,” according to the Nigerian-Igbo theologian 
Pantaleon Iroegbu (2005:442).
“If you asked ubuntu advocates and philosophers: What principles 
inform and organise your life? . . . the answers would express com-
mitment to the good of the community in which their identities 
were formed, and a need to experience their lives as bound up 
in that of their community,” contends the South African public 
intellectual Gessler Muxe Nkondo (2007:91).
What is striking about these characterizations of how to commune, 
harmonize, or otherwise become a real person is that two distinct rela-
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tional goods are repeatedly mentioned, namely, considering oneself part 
of the whole, sharing a way of life, belonging, and experiencing oneself 
as bound up with others, on the one hand, and then achieving the good 
of all, advancing the common good, serving the community, and being 
committed to the good of one’s society, on the other.
These two facets of a communal relationship have been distinguished 
and reconstructed with some precision (Metz, 2017a). It is revealing to 
understand the relationship of “identifying” with others or “sharing a way 
of life” with them (i.e., belonging, etc.) to be the combination of exhibit-
ing certain psychological attitudes of cohesion and cooperative behavior 
consequent to them. The attitudes include a tendency to think of oneself 
as a member of a group with the other and to refer to oneself as a “we” 
(rather than an “I”), a disposition to feel pride or shame in what the other 
or one’s group does and, at a higher level of intensity, an emotional appre-
ciation of the other’s nature and value. The cooperative behaviors include 
being transparent about the terms of interaction, allowing others to make 
voluntary choices, acting on the basis of trust, adopting common goals, 
and, at the extreme end, choosing for the reason that “this is who we are.”
What is labeled the relationship of “exhibiting solidarity” with or “car-
ing” for others (i.e., acting for others’ good, etc.) is similarly aptly con-
strued as the combination of exhibiting certain psychological attitudes 
and engaging in helpful behavior. Here, the attitudes are ones positively 
oriented towards the other’s good, and they include an empathetic aware-
ness of the other’s condition and a sympathetic emotional reaction to this 
awareness. The actions are not merely those likely to be beneficial, that is, 
to meet her biological, psychological, and social needs, but also are ones 
done consequent to certain motives, say, for the sake of making the other 
better off or even a better person.
Bringing things together, here are some concrete and explicit principled 
interpretations of “I am because we are” and “A person is a person through 
other persons”: one should strive to become a real self, which is matter of 
prizing those capable of identity and solidarity. Or, one ought to develop 
personhood, which means honoring people by virtue of their dignified ability 
to be party to communal relationships of sharing a way of life and caring for 
others’ quality of life. Conversely, one lacking in human excellence or who 
is “not a person” would be one who fails to respect those able to commune. 
Substantial vice or wrongdoing by this ethic consists of prizing the opposite, 
discordant relationships of acting on an “us versus them” attitude, subordinat-
ing others, harming them, and doing so out of indifference to their good.
5
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To honor communion, or those capable of it, is not a prescription to 
promote communion as much as one can, and wherever one can, in the 
long run. So, for example, one should give some priority to the communal 
relationships of which one is already a part, instead of cutting them off when 
doing so would foster marginally more communion on the part of others. 
All things being equal, the stronger and longer one’s communal ties with 
others, the greater the obligation to help them, even if it comes at some 
cost to communal relationship elsewhere in the world. This interpretation 
of partiality is meant to reconstruct the traditional sub-Saharan practice of 
prioritizing aid to blood relatives (on which see Appiah, 1998).
However, partiality is not meant to be absolute, and the urgent needs 
of strangers, who also matter for their own sake by virtue of being capable 
of communion, merit consideration and must be weighed up against the 
interests of intimates. The impartial idea that every person has dignity is 
also prominent in the African tradition (Wiredu, 1992:199–200; Gyekye, 
2010:sec. 6), and is expressed here in terms of respecting those with the 
natural ability to be communed with and to commune.
There is much more than could be said to spell out and to motivate 
this Afro-communal ethic. However, there is enough here to draw some 
conclusions about what counts as good leadership, on the supposition that 
a moral agent must respect human beings capable of communion, where 
those with whom she has already communed are entitled to some priority 
relative to strangers, whose needs nonetheless matter by virtue of being 
potential sites of communion.
From an Afro-communal ethic to an account of leadership
In the light of the previous section’s analysis, one can now grasp the 
import of maxims about leadership from the literature that might otherwise 
have been opaque. For example, probably the most common saying in an 
African context about good leadership is this: “A king is a king through his 
people” (e.g., Pheko & Linchwe, 2008:399, 409; Mofuoa, 2015:32). There 
is also this remark: “Leaders have a deep awareness that they are what they 
are because of other people” (Nussbaum, Palsule, & Mkhize, 2010:10). 
Notice how these maxims echo the ones about personhood (“A person is 
a person through other persons”) and selfhood (“I am because we are”) 
from the previous section. Supposing the communal interpretation of ethi-
cal behavior in general made there is plausible, it makes sense to construe 
these statements about leadership this way: one should become a real leader, 
which one can do insofar as one relates communally and enables others to commune.
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This conception of leadership is an instance of servant leadership, which 
phrase abounds in the literature on African approaches to leadership (Mbigi 
& Maree, 2005:102; Nicholson, 2005:260–261; Bhengu, 2006:185–187, 
229; Khoza, 2006:58–59; Mbigi, 2007:298–301; Msila, 2014; Ndlovu, 
2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ngcaweni, 2017). Broadly speaking, a servant 
leader is not so much one who gets others to do what he wants or thinks 
best, but is one who does much to help others. Servant leadership is of 
course not unfamiliar in the Western literature, but, unlike it, service is 
the patently predominant theme in the African literature on leadership. 
In addition, the Afro-communal ethic grounds a distinct specification of 
precisely what should be involved in serving others: a good leader is one 
who helps to meet others’ needs, and above all their need to realize their 
social nature by prizing communal relationship.
By this approach, communion is a way of relating to be pursued as an end, 
not solely as a means to other values such as, say, productivity or innova-
tion. The Afro-communal ethic should not be read as merely entailing the 
banalities that social capital and effective teamwork are useful to succeed 
in a competitive environment. Instead, it supports the bolder claim that 
a certain way of relating is to be valued for its own sake as a good leader.
Implications of Afro-communal leadership
What would a firm or other large organization look like if it were guided 
by the Afro-communal conception of good leadership? This section answers 
this question in a variety of contexts, often drawing contrasts with typical 
East Asian and Western conceptions of good leadership.
What is the point of a firm?
Prizing communion differs from end-pursuit (Kantianism) or desire-
satisfaction (utilitarianism), which are characteristically Western and indi-
vidualist views of what a firm, or other organization with a large public 
influence, ultimately ought to be striving to achieve. Instead of the point 
of a firm being to satisfy contingent and variable demand, a firm lead by 
Afro-communal values would exhibit solidarity with consumers, meaning 
that it would do what is expected to enable them to live objectively better 
lives, particularly socio-moral ones.
This orientation towards people’s needs, and especially their virtue, means 
that there would be reflection amongst at least shareholders and managers 
on whether a firm is selling something that is good for people (Lutz, 2009).
For example, if an Afro-communal leader took over a firm that sold 
cigarettes or food with trans fats, she would make a concerted effort to 
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shift production towards something that, for all we can tell, would not 
cause addiction, inflict serious bodily harm, and, as a consequence of these, 
disrupt familial and friendly relationships. Consumers might freely elect 
to purchase these things, but that is not a sufficient reason to sell them for 
one who deems good leadership to consist of prizing communion.
Confucian values, so prominent in East Asia, are also well known for 
similarly directing a firm to act in an objectively beneficent way towards 
consumers (e.g., Ip, 2009). However, one difference with the Afro-com-
munal approach, in terms of what the final end of a firm should be, is that 
Confucianism tends to prize relationship as a final value to be promoted 
that can be distinct from the good of individuals. If relationships such as 
balance or integration have some significant final value in themselves, 
then a leader could wind up treating individuals merely as a means to 
the end of promoting them, something admitted by those sympathetic 
to Confucianism (e.g., Ip, 2009:470; and Li, 2014:14). In contrast, by the 
Afro-communal conception of leadership advanced here, each person has 
a dignity in virtue of her capacity to commune and to be communed with, 
which means that, to treat every person with respect, a leader must strive 
to meet the needs of each.
Whom should a firm aid?
A firm cannot meet the needs of literally all; it must rather attend to those 
of its stakeholders. But who counts as a stakeholder, that is, as someone for 
whom a firm has moral reason to go out of its way to aid? 
In the Western tradition, there are two main moral reasons to help 
someone: she is amongst the worst off and so owed aid because of a general 
duty to help, or she is someone whom we have assumed an obligation to 
aid in particular, say, by promising or by accepting the benefits from a 
cooperative scheme of which she is a member. By this largely Kantian and 
Rawlsian approach, the leader of a firm roughly must take positive steps to 
carry out what it has contracted to do and must also donate, in the form 
of a corporate social responsibility program, to those who are especially 
badly off.
In addition to these two moral reasons to aid others, the Afro-communal 
ethic grounds a third reason: one has already related communally with 
others to some extent (Metz, 2017b; Woermann & Engelbrecht, 2019). If 
one has been party to a communal relationship with others intensely or 
for a long time, and especially both, then one can have some strong moral 
reason to aid these intimates as opposed to strangers, even if the latter are 
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worse off and if one did not promise to aid the former. Such an approach 
plausibly explains why a parent owes more to her children than to other 
people’s children.
Applied to a business context, Afro-communal leadership would mean 
that a firm goes out of its way to help not merely those in desperate need of 
aid or those it has promised to aid, but also those with whom it has shared 
a way of life, including its society. African thinkers have sometimes noted 
the duty of a firm to aid those near to it (Bhengu, 2006:160–161; Amaeshi 
& Idemudia, 2015), but the appeal to Afro-communal leadership explains 
why the duty obtains: a firm has identified with the society in which it 
is based and therefore has moral reason to exhibit solidarity with it, too.
An additional implication is that if a firm has a long-standing relationship 
with a particular supplier, the former’s leaders would have some moral reason 
to continue to contract with the latter, even if a new supplier would be 
marginally less expensive. The reason is not invariably the most important, 
for instance a firm’s leaders need not continue to contract with a supplier 
regardless of how expensive its goods or how shoddy its services become. 
The point is that there would usually be some moral cost to be considered 
when deciding whether to dump a long-standing supplier.
How should a firm make decisions?
An account of which decisions a firm should make (say, when it comes 
to which products to make or whom to aid) is one thing, while an account 
of how to make those decisions is another. How should business and other 
leaders go about determining which policies and practices to adopt?
Here, the Afro-communal theory parts ways with much of both the East 
Asian and Western traditions of philosophical thought about leadership. 
Typical Western thinkers and managers, appealing to Kantian (or Lock-
ean) ideas, consider consent to be ruled to be sufficient to give managers 
the authority to determine the course of a firm. Basically, the fact that 
a worker has contracted to submit her labor-power to the direction of a 
firm’s managers in exchange for a wage is enough to warrant her obedi-
ence to managerial decree. East Asian thinkers and managers, appealing 
particularly to Confucianism, consider superior qualifications sufficient to 
give managers the authority to govern the workplace (Ip, 2009:469–470).
Both traditions can of course recommend consultation with employees as 
often being a useful way to further the proper final ends of a firm. However, 
neither approach entails that input, let alone authorization, from employees 
is morally required as a way to give them their due. Afro-communal leader-
9
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ship, in contrast, does. Perhaps the most salient theme in the literature on 
good leadership in the sub-Saharan tradition is the idea that leaders should 
normally deploy consensual democracy when making decisions (Bhengu, 
2006:191–193, 230; Nussbaum, 2003; Mbigi & Maree, 2005:8, 29–30, 
58–60; Khoza, 2006; Boon, 2007:82–93, 103–109, 125, 150–152; Mbigi, 
2007:299–300; Ncube, 2010:79–80). By this approach, it is not enough 
to consult with employees or even to give them a vote; in addition, all in 
the firm should usually be expected to agree to the essentials before going 
forward. Agreeing does not imply that everyone comes to share the same 
judgment, but instead means, at the core, that no one has objections to the 
proposal so strenuous as to hold back the rest from acting on it.
Such an approach seems to follow from the Afro-communal ethic 
expounded above. If a key goal is to realize communion in a firm or other 
organization, then a leader will aim to ensure that all genuinely share a 
way of life, which includes sharing the power to create it together. Shar-
ing a way of life, as explained above, is not merely people living the same 
way, which way of life could be imposed from above. Instead, it essentially 
includes cooperative participation, prescribing unanimitarian democracy 
not merely when it comes to (representative) political legislation, but also 
other major public spheres of life. In addition, such an approach to decision-
making would best enable people to enjoy a sense of togetherness, thinking 
of themselves as a “we” and taking pride in their collective accomplish-
ments. And, then, consensual democracy would usually be expected to 
realize solidarity (Gyekye, 1997:130–131, 142). Everyone’s interests are 
most likely to be adequately promoted when everyone freely signs onto a 
policy consequent to deliberation about it.
Readers might doubt that it is realistic to expect consensus among a large 
group of people. For now, on behalf of the consensual model, consider how 
the Paris climate change talks were conducted back in 2015. Fascinatingly, 
by appealing to conflict resolution techniques used by the Zulu people of 
South Africa, some 200 countries, naturally with quite divergent perspec-
tives, were brought to unanimous agreement in about two days’ time (Rathi 
2015; cf. Boon 2007).
How should a workplace be organized?
In the 21st century efficiency is invariably sought by means of managerial-
ism, in both the East and the West. That is, in order to maximize outputs 
and minimize inputs, subordinates are steered, usually with money or power, 
in ways that call for the production of standardized outputs according to 
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measurable criteria. Such an approach is thought to be justified philosophi-
cally either by the idea that managerialist production would benefit society 
or that it has been freely agreed to by workers. Afro-communal leadership, 
however, is ambivalent about the aptness of such a mode of production.
On the one hand, a firm has moral reason to commune with sharehold-
ers and with consumers, which provides some reason for it to “squeeze” 
employees to do what it takes to produce goods/services efficiently. If 
managerialism best fostered efficiency of a sort that was likely to make the 
lives of shareholders and consumers objectively better off, that would be 
some reason for a leader to use it to orient the workplace.
On the other hand, managerialism is on the face of it “anti-social” when 
it comes to the way that managers treat employees (as per Metz, 2017c). It 
hardly fosters a sense of togetherness between these two groups of people. 
Its use of steering mechanisms, such as financial incentives and punitive 
threats, is prima facie incompatible with cooperative participation on the 
part of workers. In addition, managerialism is unlikely to foster sympathy, 
and probably encourages managers to view workers as human resources, 
not so much as people whose interests matter for their own sake. Although 
workers might gain financially from doing well by managerialist crite-
ria, their own good in the production process is of little interest beyond 
avoiding health and safety violations. Still more, if workers are competing 
against each other for scarce rewards, as is often the case, then a spirit of 
camaraderie amongst them and an inclination of some to sacrifice for the 
sake of others are discouraged.
It appears, therefore, that the value of communion pulls in different 
directions when it comes to how to organize a workplace. The natural 
resolution of the tension is compromise. Here are two examples of how a 
leader inspired by Afro-communal values might proceed. First, she might 
retain the use of numerical targets that workers must meet, but not set 
them down unilaterally. Instead, she could go beyond merely consulting 
with workers about targets by obtaining their unanimous agreement to 
them, upon discussion of what would be best for all those affected by the 
firm. Second, a leader might retain the use of a year-end bonus to express 
appreciation and to motivate, but not allocate it strictly in proportion to 
the quantified output of individuals. Instead, she could award the same 
bonus to all those who have done well enough, if not share profits in a 
more robust sense with them (briefly suggested by Bhengu, 2006:179–180, 
192; and Ncube, 2010:79).
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How are emotions of relevance to an organization?
Any plausible view of leadership will entail that a leader is good insofar 
as she takes employees’ emotions into account. However, what stands out 
about the Afro-communal approach to leadership is that cultivating certain 
feelings and attitudes is good for its own sake, not merely as a means to an 
end in order to motivate employees to perform, the natural approach of 
Confucianism and Kantian contract theory.
A communal relationship is not merely behavioral, that is, not merely a 
matter of coordination and mutual aid. It is also psychological and specifi-
cally emotional. For one, part of a communal relationship involves a sense 
of togetherness such as feeling pride in what others accomplish and liking 
being with others. For another, communion includes feeling sympathy and 
compassion for others.
Insofar as one major task of a leader is to forge communion in a firm, she 
must therefore be committed to prompting such feelings and attitudes, and 
do so as ends in themselves. Such a theoretical rationale explains why some 
African leadership proponents have been right to recommend—fascinat-
ingly—that an organization include ritual, prayer, song, and dance (Mbigi 
& Maree, 2005:50–52, 102, 108; Bhengu, 2006:186–187; Boon, 2007:68, 
83). These would be ways to bring people closer together on an emotional 
level and thereby to realize communion along a certain dimension.
How should conflict be resolved?
Consider two ways of dealing with actual and potential problems in the 
workplace that Afro-communal leadership would abjure. First, note that 
American managers are known for having the discretion to fire at will 
for under-performance or misbehavior. Many American workers can be 
dismissed immediately for failing to perform or even for no cause at all, 
an approach that is on the face of it consistent with a contractual ethical 
orientation. Second, think about the reputation that Chinese managers in 
Africa have for hiring Chinese laborers, and not so much African ones, 
because the former are expected to be more highly skilled and compliant 
than the latter. Although such practices might in fact not be so widespread 
(Xiaoyang, 2016), it is worth considering what would be wrong with them 
from an Afro-communal perspective.
There is an underlying similarity between immediately dismissing some-
one perceived to be a problem in the workplace and not even hiring those 
expected to be: exclusion. In contrast, inclusion is a salient theme in the 
literature on African leadership. It highlights using emotional intelligence 
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to address conflict, trying hard to develop weak employees, and enabling 
everyone to feel part of a community (Blunt & Jones, 1997:15; Nicholson, 
2005:261; Boon, 2007:62–63; Msila, 2014:1107). Conspicuously absent 
from African thought about leadership are ideas of using fear, imposing 
retribution, or simply removing an employee altogether (without having 
tried to bring him up to speed).
Again, a focus on communion provides a plausible theoretical explana-
tion of why inclusiveness should be the overarching approach of a good 
leader. If what matters morally about us is our capacity to commune and to 
be communed with, then respect for that special value will mean creating 
relationships and repairing them when they have broken down. Instead of 
summarily dismissing an employee who has made a mistake, a good leader 
would try to ascertain why she did so, consider whether the employee could 
be reformed, and, if so, offer a second chance. And instead of avoiding 
hiring people who might be more difficult to work with as employees, a 
good leader would give them a chance and do what he could to develop 
their abilities, particularly if he were a visitor in their land.
In conclusion, it is not obvious what makes someone a good leader, 
particularly in the light of conflicting value systems around the world. 
This article has expounded a conception of good leadership that is under-
appreciated in the English-speaking literature on the topic. Specifically, 
it has drawn on the African intellectual tradition to develop a normative 
theory of leadership in terms of prizing people by virtue of their capacity to 
relate communally. Although some of its concrete prescriptions have already 
been recommended in the literature, this article has aimed to show how 
they can all be theoretically grounded on the basic value of communion 
that is prominent in African philosophical discussions of morality. It has also 
sought to argue that these prescriptions constitute plausible alternatives to 
what characteristically East Asian or Western accounts of leadership support.
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Notes
1. This article uses geographical labels such as “African” and “Western” to mean features 
salient in a large array of space and over a long span of time. Hence, these terms imply 
neither that these features can be found solely in this place, nor that they can be found 
everywhere in it.
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2. For a survey of how several sub-Saharan peoples understand these maxims, see Nkulu-
N’Sengha (2009).
3. These ascriptions are meant to signify a lack of virtue, but not a lack of dignity or full 
moral status; one can be lacking humanness but still be a human being entitled to human 
rights.
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